Presidential elections in Algeria and Tunisia: Nothing new under the sun?
Massaoud ROMDHANI
A human rights activist and defender, former president of the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights and the Tunisian League of Human Rights (Vice president).
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Algeria and Tunisia share borders and a history of struggle against French colonialism. The two countries’ official policies under the two presidents, Algerian Abdelmadjid Tebboune and Tunisian Kais Saied, are almost identical at the regional level (the position on Western Sahara, the position in regional conflicts), the national level, and even in political turns and electoral dates. Abdelmadjid Tebboune’s election came after the Algerian Hirak movement, which lasted for months and ended with the resignation of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Tebboune won the first multiparty elections in Algeria in 2019. Kais Saied came to politics late. After the 2011 uprising, his victory in the 2019 elections was a “revolution” against a political and party system neglecting the basic issues of the people.
Observers do not expect surprises in the 7 September 2024 elections in Algeria or the 6 October elections in Tunisia. In recent years, both presidents have strengthened an authoritarian regime, using state agencies and institutions in their election campaigns, rendering the chances of other candidates slim, if not non-existent. In addition, both presidents have a record of violations and restrictions on freedom of the press, opinion, and expression. The Algerian regime has increased its restrictions on public space and during the spring of 2024 enacted laws and legislation that “strangle what remains of political and civil expression.”[1] The Tunisian regime chose to imprison Tunisian opposition leaders, either on charges of “conspiring against state security,” or “terrorism.” Presidential candidates in Tunisia woke up to civil cases that prevented some from running and sent others to prison.[2]
Premature elections in Algeria: Restoring normalcy or reflecting a deep crisis?
On 24 March 2024, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune issued a shocking presidential decree after meeting with the Prime Minister, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the President of the Constitutional Court: announcing the date of the presidential elections on 7 September 2024, three months before the elections’ scheduled date. The presidency did not disclose the reasons for the advancement. However, the official Algerian Press Service provided three reasons: The first relates to “restoring normalcy,” to rectify the postponement that occurred in 2019. The second relates to President Tebboune's keenness to “return to the people and rely on their rule and awareness," and the third to “strengthen the unity and harmony of Algerians,” the president, the army, and institutions “in the face of external challenges.”[3] According to the National Press Service, Algeria is facing a pressing division that will affect the future of the nation in the face of the new colonial powers.[4]
These aforementioned reasons failed to prevent criticism from some opposition parties, who saw the advancement as “ambiguity and a lack of transparency,” because the presidency withheld its reasons and motives. In any case, this advancement “serves President Tebboune to remain in power, especially since the political situation in the country is not at its best.”[5]
Some analysts further considered that the authority’s sudden decision (to advance the elections) “is nothing more than a political decision par excellence and a trick, intended to thwart the maneuvers of opponents at home and abroad for the ultimate goal, which is to strengthen the existing authority and consolidate the ruling system in its entirety, after successive disappointments at the political level, including the failure to join the BRICS group, difficulties in the African Sahel region and in relations with Mali, as well as with France and Spain.” [6]
Kais Saied: “The people demand” a national president
Since Kais Saied’s monopolization of all powers on 25 July 2021 and his issuance of the decree of 22 September 2022, declaring that the President of the Republic handles amendments, all constitutional reforms, and the enactment of laws. Saied has continued to clarify his intention to grant himself absolute powers by fragmenting independent institutions, including the Supreme Judicial Council and the Anti-Corruption Agency, dismissing recalcitrant judges and rejecting the Administrative Court’s decision to reinstate them, and considering the judiciary a mere function in his new constitution after it was a power in the 2014 constitution. Saied further issued Decree 54, under which dozens of journalists, bloggers, and citizens are subject to heavy prison sentences for merely criticizing the authorities and imprisonment of opposition leaders and refusal to prosecute them, despite the expiration of the legal period of detention. Kais Said clearly seeks to desertify political life to implement his vision of grassroots democracy and complete his “political project” of grassroots construction despite the deteriorating economic and social crisis, high rates of debt, and inflation.
Kais Saied stated on several occasions that he is the one who sets the conditions for candidacy for the presidential elections and further determines the candidates’ orientations and relationships, as they “must be patriotic” and “have no ties with abroad,” thus making him the only candidate who “carries a national and popular project.”
In Saied’s dictionary, all opponents who are not patriotic and are “conspiring with foreign powers,” “they should not run.” He has been repeating this since 2021.[7] He further threatened that “the issue for him is one of national liberation,” and “a matter of survival or extinction,” suggesting to observers that “his mandate will not end soon,” and that he does not see any of his competitors of merit and patriotism to stand before him. [8]
Not only did Kais Saied strike institutions and restrict freedom of expression, he changed the law of the Independent High Electoral Commission, which was elected since the 2011 uprising, by the parliament. Saied further decided to dismiss the parliament deputies. In April 2022, a presidential decree was issued in the Official Gazette, stating, “The board of the commission consists of seven members appointed by presidential order.” The former head of the commission refused all orders and was subsequently dismissed, and commented that “it has become clear that it is the president’s election commission.”[9]
Algeria’s elections “pre-determined”?
On 20 July 2024, in the midst of preparations for the Algerian presidential elections, political and civil figures, lawyers, and human rights defenders issued a remarkable statement confirming that the results of the elections are “predetermined,”[10] and “a farce in form and content,” and that the farce will continue as long as the regime, “which has isolated Algeria diplomatically and geo-security-wise and reduced its foreign policy and strategic roles to hollow roles, offering itself and the country as a victim of foreign plots and permanent threats.”
The Algerian economy does not face the same conditions as the Tunisian economy, which suffers from high inflation, lack of growth, lack of basic materials, and an alarming rise in debt (up to 80 percent of GDP), as Algeria benefits from oil and gas rents, which support the country’s budget with about 97 percent of hard currency. However, the lack of economic diversity, volatile mood of the global energy market, increase in public spending, and lack of transparency in business and administration require good governance, planning, anticipation of changes, and deep reforms of economic trends, which the current political climate does not contribute to.
Islamists in Algeria and Tunisia: Divided and imprisoned
Historically, Islamists in Algeria and Tunisia have proven to be the most organized and effective opposition movements capable of competing with existing regimes. The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won the legislative elections in 1991, a victory that neither the Algerian regime nor its armed forces expected, plunging the country into a bloody decade of violence. Followed by a peace treaty between the authorities, with the Bouteflika administration being generous in offering concessions for a “reconciliation charter” in return for ensuring the support of the Islamists.
Today, Islamist parties are entering the Algerian elections divided between supporting and opposing the candidacy of Abdelmadjid Tebboune, with some even questioning the integrity of the elections. The National Construction Movement, the second largest Islamist party, is not only backing Tebboune to “continue to protect national constants,” but its structures are also touring the country to support the president. Meanwhile, Abdelaali Hassani Cherif, head of the Islamist Movement of Society for Peace, is running against the President of Algeria, while the Justice and Development Front has chosen not to enter the elections because such democratic procedures can only succeed “by providing the necessary guarantees to build a real democracy and a peaceful transfer of power.”[11]
Algeria's Islamists are divided for numerous reasons, including the absence of historical and influential leaders, temptations of power, uncomfortable public political process for most Islamist movements, and modest performance during the 2019 Hirak movement. The Tunisian Ennahda movement has been exhausted by its poor performance during its decade of rule, the decline of its popularity, and the decay of its leadership. Kais Saied and his regime have only completed the process of weakening by putting Ennahda’s leaders in prison, over charges of “terrorism” or “suspicious foreign funding,” charges that are currently difficult to prove due to the absence of independent justice, an absence clearly confirmed by the presence of peaceful opposition leaders in prison or being prosecuted for political reasons.
The fraught atmosphere of the presidential elections:
If transparent and fair elections can only take place in a democratic climate that guarantees the neutrality of state institutions and respects freedom of expression and the independence of institutions, elections in both countries remain far from those standards. Following the Hirak movement of 2019, Algeria witnessed a significant deterioration in the level of freedoms. Independent and opposition journalists faced prison sentences and judicial prosecutions, media institutions were closed, and credible human rights organizations were forced to dissolve by judicial decisions, including Algerian League for the Defense of Human Rights (LADDH) and the Rassemblement Actions Jeunesse (RAJ), among other independent associations and organizations. This climate contributed to the desertification of political and human rights. Observers expect the elections to lose the element of surprise, and the competition in the Algerian elections will remain unequal, as indicated by Toufik Bougaada, a professor of political science at Algerian universities. Bougaada addressed the factors influencing the reluctance to participate and possibly vote, resulting from the Algerians’ belief that “the results are predetermined,” and even the rhetoric of rival candidates remained based on “the idea of activating the electoral campaign and not winning the elections.”[12]
In Tunisia, some faint hopes are pinned on the general session of the Administrative Court, which will soon consider the appeals filed by the candidates dropped by the Electoral Commission. The two rival candidates to Saied accepted by the Commission, Zouhair Meghzawi, Secretary General of the People’s Movement (nationalist), a movement that was one of the first to support him in his actions since 25 July, and Ayachi Zammal, founder of the Azmoun Movement, announced that they face continuous harassment. The first, Meghzawi, had his regional meeting scheduled for Sunday 25 July prevented due to “security and political interventions,” according to his latest statement (the People's Movement statement on Saturday 25 August 2024). The second, Zammal, is still under judicial prosecution for collecting endorsements.
Kais Saied recently carried out a ministerial reshuffle of most of the ministries, a few weeks before the election date, indicating that he has no intention of leaving power and is fully determined to complete another term of five years. However, there is a new factor of news being circulated insistently about him entering into a dispute with the military establishment,[13] an establishment that supported his measures on 25 July 2021, and placed a tank in front of the ousted parliament. Does this indicate a conflict within the ruling apparatus, a conflict that may indicate the possibility of upcoming political changes?
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[1] Arab NGO Network for Development, “Civic Space in Algeria at the beginning of 2024: Legislative and Political Challenges Restricting All Freedoms,” 5 Jun 2024. Web.
[2] Human Rights Watch, “Tunisia: Prospective Presidential Candidates Barred,” 20 Aug 2024. Web.
[3] APS, “Présidentielle anticipée: les raisons d'une annonce,” 22 Mar 2024. Web.
[4] Ibid
[5] Alhurra, “Political or Technical Motives? Questions about the Algerian presidency’s decision that ‘surprised many,’” 23 Mar 2024. Web.
[6] Medias 24, “L’Election Présidentielle anticipée en Algérie est le reflet d’une crise profonde,” 22 Mar 2024. Web.
[7] Daraj, “Tunisia’s Presidential Election: Kais Saied’s slogan: ‘Survive or perish,’” 6 Apr 2024. Web.
[8] Ibid
[9] DW, “Tunisia's president gives himself the power to appoint the electoral commission and its president,” 22 Aor 2024. Web.
[10] Ultra Algeria, “Political figures oppose presidential elections and call for a constituent democratic transition,” 20 Jul 2024. Web.
[11] Ibid
[12] Maghreb Voices, “Does the timing of the election campaign affect the turnout in Algeria's presidential elections?” 14 Aug 2024. Web.
[13] MONDAfrique, “Les tensions grandissantes entre Kais Saïed et l’armée tunisienne”, 21 Aug 2024. Web.
