Libya: The role of NGOs on migration management in transit sites

Abdelrhman ZAYID

An independent researcher and journalist, focusing on rights and humanitarian issues.

Libyan civil society faces challenges of the migration crisis within a restricted space shaped by local policies and European pressure. Since the outbreak of the Libyan civil war in 2011, political efforts have varied to guarantee the success of the democratic transition phase and to strengthen democratic mechanisms, including the independence of the third sector (civil society). However, local policies have recently tended to restrict Libyan civil society spaces, negatively affecting the work of human rights and humanitarian organizations.

The external policy of the European border externalization system further supports armed groups implementing border management programmes.

The European Union funds and supports legalized armed groups that intercept migrants at sea and take them to detention centers. Armed groups fulfill their role by further implementing local policies on non-governmental organizations through campaigns of arbitrary arrests of activists and human rights defenders.

Externalization and civil society: The Gaddafi period

A transit country is a location subject to multiple arrangements as a gateway for irregular migration. Governments and international organizations coordinate to achieve the goals of border externalization policies. The term “border externalization” is used to describe the expansion of border and migration controls beyond so-called “migrant-receiving countries” in the Global North, and into neighboring or “migrant-sending countries” in the Global South.

“Libya is considered one of the sites with most irregular migration in the Global South, because of its vast borders as a transit country and as a major departure point to Europe, although Libya also acts as a host country for migrants and refugees.”

 The term “border externalization” further refers to a range of practices from border controls and rescue operations to measures addressing migration motives. Libya is considered one of the sites with most irregular migration in the Global South, because of its vast borders as a transit country and as a major departure point to Europe, although Libya also acts as a host country for migrants and refugees.

For decades, Libya has been the subject of Global North migration related interventions. European donors (destination countries) fully funded numerous programmes, initiatives and activities, while UN agencies and civil society organizations implemented them on the ground, with a large focus on the themes of migration management, protection and humanitarian assistance. This is partially due to the global phenomenon of “a significant expansion and deepening complexity of subcontracting   arrangements, auditing techniques, partnership frameworks and global compacts linking metropolitan states, multilateral agencies, NGOs and private companies.”

Structurally, during the Gaddafi regime the third sector did not differ much from its counterparts in autocratic states. The legal framework for civil associations in Libya was distinguished by severe restrictions and lack of independence, effectively hindering any emergence of a true civil society. As a result, the number of civil society associations before 17 February reached 274. Law 19/2001 addresses relations between local and international organizations, stipulating that it is not permissible to join or participate with any foreign organization or accept donations from it except with the approval of the competent authorities. However, there was limited space allowing the presence of a limited number of UN agencies and humanitarian organizations involved in implementing migration management programmes.

“ Law 19/2001 addresses relations between local and international organizations, stipulating that it is not permissible to join or participate with any foreign organization or accept donations from it except with the approval of the competent authorities. ”

Migration management is defined as a technocratic and managerial approach that “presents itself as practical, realistic, humane, and benefits all parties involved, whether countries of origin, countries of destination, and migrants alike.” Migration management further presents to stakeholders as a middle-ground approach addressing migration-related concerns, bringing together multiple relevant actors, and can also provide a response to the need for international migration governance. Humanitarian border work is generally defined as traditional humanitarian work conducted in accordance with humanitarian principles that takes place in borderlands and is focused on alleviating suffering at borders.

In early 2000, the lifting of the international embargo on Gaddafi played an important factor in the formulation of multilateral agreements to govern migration through civil society. Within the EU’s border externalization policy, Libya accepted Italian and European funding and equipment for migration management, and agreed to return people who crossed the sea to Italy to its territory. The European Union funded numerous migration management programs implemented by international and local organizations. The International Organization for Peace, Care and Relief (IOPCR) is one of the few Libyan NGOs with a direct relationship to border externalization policies. IOPCR was founded in 2000, but only began working in the field of migration in 2006. Moreover, IOPCR is a state-led institution indirectly created by the Gaddafi regime. Regarding foreign organizations, the Libyan authorities allowed the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to open its offices in 2006, and the Italian Refugee Council (CIR), a humanitarian non-governmental organization charged with protecting refugees and asylum seekers, began its humanitarian activities in 2009. The CIR participated in a project funded by the European Commission aiming to provide humanitarian assistance to refugees and migrants, and further monitor the situation of a number of detention centers inside Libya. Therefore, the European border externalization policy was one of the factors creating suitable conditions for NGOs to work in the field of migration in Libya.

After the CIR opened its office in Libya, a sharp conflict emerged between the policies of the border management system and humanitarian migration programmes. In May 2009, Italian authorities began returning people from international waters to Libyan ports. The Italian government then responded to claims that the returns would violate the principle of non-refoulement, by stating that the presence of the CIR in Libya guarantees that the rights of returnees are respected. CIR further filed an application against Italy with the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), resulting in a court ruling condemning Italy for violating the prohibition of inhuman treatment, the prohibition of collective expulsion, and the right to an effective remedy, putting an end to interceptions and forced returns to Libya. Humanitarian organizations further addressed this issue, as a number of them continued to relay information to international human rights organizations on forced and illegal returns of asylum seekers, which helped launch advocacy campaigns through naming and defamation, as happened in the case of the Eritreans.

Migration management: After February 17

After the toppling of Gaddafi, the legislative laws restricting the third sector were lifted, and civil society could enjoy the right to freedom of association. Since then, about 3,000 NGOs have been officially registered, while foreign organizations witnessed a tremendous growth in the number of humanitarian border work organizations. In 2016, the Libya INGO Forum (LIF) was founded as an independent network of 23 international NGOs implementing humanitarian programmes, or in the process of preparing humanitarian programmes, to respond to the needs of marginalized populations living in Libya. The dynamics of the relationship between international and local organizations varied, with international organizations playing the role of supporting and enhancing the capabilities of local non-governmental organizations, and on the other hand, playing the role of applying governmental policies.

“ International organizations and the EU launched several projects to support the development of Libyan civil society organizations.”

Independent civil society is recognized as a new phenomenon in Libyan society, which led many emerging local organizations to face numerous challenges in implementing migration management programmes. International non-governmental donors and organizations, and local organizations believe that Libyan civil society needs to be “professionalized.” Libyan civil society is characterized by “very limited capacity” and the “lack of independence” of many of the organizations from political actors or warring parties, making some of them “untrusted” by donors.

International organizations and the EU launched several projects to support the development of Libyan civil society organizations. The International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) is implementing numerous projects funded by EU aimed at training local civil society on “strategic and institutional management of migration in Libya.” Moreover, ICMPD is implementing numerous “professionalization” projects to provide local organizations with the necessary capabilities to compete in the global market for international cooperation, in terms of developing proposals, applying for funding, managing resources, monitoring projects, and preparing reports to donors.

Despite the European border externalization policy strengthening the capabilities of Libyan civil society, it further reinforced human rights violations and a culture of impunity. Italy and the EU continued to fund border management programmes by supporting, equipping and training the Libyan Coast Guard. According to UNHCR: “During rescues/interception operations at sea, the Libyan Coast Guard (LCG) have reportedly been involved in human rights violations against refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants, including the deliberate sinking of boats using firearms. The LCG have also been accused of colluding with smuggling networks.” International observers have continued to report the complicity of government officials involved in human trafficking operations, including officials from the Ministry of the Interior and the Department of Combating Illegal Migration. This indicates that the priority of the security aspect in border externalization policy reflects that humanitarian border work may be considered an essential protocol to legitimize security operations against migrants in search and rescue areas (SAR).

“ International observers have continued to report the complicity of government officials involved in human trafficking operations, including officials from the Ministry of the Interior and the Department of Combating Illegal Migration.”

In terms of land, access to detention centers in Libya is one of the problems facing local and international organizations interested in humanitarian border management. The transitional governments do not allow all organizations to access and operate except in detention centers under the direct control of the Department of Combating Illegal Migration. Unofficial Detention centers are difficult for organizations to access. However, the problem of the conflict between humanitarian principles and normalization of detention centers is emerging, with some NGOs (ACTED, Intersos, among others) prefer not to operate in these centers, while other NGOs take a “be there” approach, believing that being inside detention centers is a necessary step toward achieving long-term goals in ending migration detention, or at least improving their conditions.

Some organizations working on migration management programs in Libya avoid being a subcontractor for projects funded by destination countries. As these institutions provide direct support to Libyan border management programmes. The European Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF for Africa) faced criticism for funding forced returns from international waters managed by the LCG. On land, the Italian Agency for Cooperation and Development (AICS) has fostered corruption within Libyan detention centers by handing over aid for detainees to center managers, who in turn sell it to third parties. Thus, humanitarian organizations are adopting more independent work models, to avoid conflict with their humanitarian goals and principles. Doctors Without Borders (MSF) is one of the organizations that refuses EU grants for border management projects. MSF’s independence has contributed to advocacy, criticism and condemnation of ongoing violations by armed groups funded and supported by the European Union and Italy.

Restricting civil society spaces

In March 2019, many indicators became clear about attempts to transform Libya into a hybrid state. The Presidential Council of the Government of National Accord approved Regulation no. 286 of 2019 for the work of the Commission of Civil Society. Regulation no. 286 was based on Law 19/2001 of the Gaddafi regime, with the aim of restricting the third sector. Despite this backward regulation, a group of local organizations succeeded in blocking the regulation before the Libyan judiciary, and temporarily suspending attempts to restore previous legislative laws for the formation of associations. In March 2023, the Prime Minister of the Government of National Unity office issued Circular no. 7 of 2023, stipulating the regulation of the work of civil society institutions in accordance with Law 19/2001. Accordingly, the Aman against Discrimination and the Hiwar Organization for Democratic Transition filed a lawsuit before the Al-Bayda Court against Circular no. 7, in which the court ruled that the circular was null and that Resolution no. 321 of 2023 emanating from it regarding the formation of a “Committee to Support and Regulate the Work of Civil Society Institutions” was abolished. Successive interim governments continue to seek restricting civil society organizations by stopping the flow of information about human rights violations issued by local organizations and sent to international organizations to complete advocacy campaigns, including naming and defamation.

“Successive interim governments continue to seek restricting civil society organizations by stopping the flow of information about human rights violations issued by local organizations and sent to international organizations to complete advocacy campaigns, including naming and defamation.”

The state of conflict over the restructuring of civil society, and the absence of constitutional legislation granting civil society independence, are among the determining reasons for the position towards official institutions by organizations implementing land-based migration management programs. Following recent attempts to restrict civil society, organizations working in humanitarian border management inside Libya have become afraid of the possibility of canceling or refusing to renew their registration within the Commission of Civil Society. This is evident from the absence of advocacy campaigns by onshore organizations. Humanitarian organizations present at sea and deployed in search and rescue (SAR) areas have not stopped campaigning for advocacy and denouncing the violations that occur to migrants inside Libya, which may be seen as disruptive factors for border management programmes.

Donors and some international organizations onshore pressure local organizations to comply with restrictive local decisions. Civil society organizations are working not on behalf of the Libyan authorities, but on behalf of their (mostly European) donors to fill the gaps of the incompetence of the Libyan authorities. Despite the re-registration of numerous Libyan organizations in the Global North to avoid normalization with the modern autocratic procedures of Libyan commissions of civil society, European donors and UN agencies require local organizations to renew their registration through Libyan institutions. However, numerous donors located in the Global North who are not registered with the Commission of Civil Society, and have contracted with many Libyan organizations that are no longer able to re-new their registration within Libya. This “be there” approach of donors and international organizations influences local humanitarian organizations in favor of the autocratic policies of the Libyan authorities.

“The reduction of civil society spaces further affected local human rights organizations and border management programmes in different aspects. ”

The reduction of civil society spaces further affected local human rights organizations and border management programmes in different aspects. The effective role of Libyan human rights organizations lies in observing and monitoring the transitional governments regarding their international obligations. Libya has not ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention, amid absence of national laws or administrative bodies to deal with refugees and asylum seekers. However, Libya has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention against Torture (CAT). Governments restrict the flow of information about their own poor performance of human rights violations in response to pressure from civil society organizations to comply with ratified international human rights treaties. Civil society continues to face restrictions even if the state has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention against Torture. This reduction of civil society spaces made a positive impact on European border management programmes funding the Libyan Coast Guard and the Department of Combating Illegal Migration responsible for human rights violations against migrants, refugees and asylum seekers.

Successively, tension increased between local and international organizations, and between United Nations agencies. The IOM face criticism with focus on “Who is the IOM organization intended to protect?”, due to its clear mandate, and support for state policies, and its relationship with member states. Furthermore, voluntary returns or “assisted voluntary return” programmes clearly aim at keeping people away from Europe, as people arbitrarily detained indefinitely are not in a position to make any voluntary choice. In terms of UNHCR, many NGOs consider UNHCR’s funding as a major problem, due to the agency’s high degree of willingness to compromise with the authorities, including Libyan authorities, by accepting asylum applications from citizens of only nine countries, or by limiting the provision of services to refugees.

Hybrid security sector

The interim governments pursued security sector governance policy with a direct impact on the third sector and migration governance policy. Since 2011, armed groups have gradually taken control of the state through a process of institutionalization, paving the way for their representatives to reach the upper levels of the military, security services, and civilian government. By 2022, the influence of legalized armed groups on civil society organizations, became clear. Armed groups launched arrest campaigns against human rights defenders, women’s rights activists, journalists, and civil society groups, which created an atmosphere of fear pushing people into hiding or exile.

“The influence of armed groups surpassed the third sector, to have different roles in border management programmes. The Stability Support Apparatus, an armed group directly affiliated with the Government of National Unity, intercepts refugees and migrants at sea, and then sends them to detention centers under its control. ”

The influence of armed groups surpassed the third sector, to have different roles in border management programmes. The Stability Support Apparatus, an armed group directly affiliated with the Government of National Unity, intercepts refugees and migrants at sea, and then sends them to detention centers under its control. These detention centers are considered unofficial sites that are not controlled by the Ministry of Interior, and organizations working in humanitarian border management are not allowed to access them. Migrants and refugees detained within these centers are frequently subjected to forced labor, sexual violence including forced prostitution.

Armed groups as an actor in border management programmes, have a direct relationship to the European border externalization system. Tariq ben Zeyad militia, affiliated with Saddam Haftar, the son of Khalifa Haftar, intercepts refugee boats trying to escape from Libya, with the aid of logistical support from the European Union border agency Frontex and the Maltese government. Saddam Haftar oversaw smuggling networks in the eastern region through new routes to the Global North. The first flight takes Bangladeshi and Syrian migrants by plane, via Syria, to Benghazi airport and then on boats to Europe, likely in cooperation with Russia’s Wagner Group. By 2023, more than half of arrivals to Italy from Libya came from Haftar’s eastern routes.

Amid a fragile transit state, Libyan civil society faces the challenges of the migration crisis within a narrow space restricting it from carrying out its humanitarian work. Despite interim governments supporting the independence of non-governmental organizations in the early stages of the conflict, and supported the border externalization system to increase the efficiency of civil society organizations, they have recently moved locally towards formulating autocratic laws to restrict civil society, and internationally towards supporting border externalization policies for hybrid security governance implementing autocratic policies. However, the interim governments are expected to allocate specific space to humanitarian organizations to as an essential component of the European border externalization system.

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